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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, so much attention has been directed towards reforming
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities, and so much inaccurate history
has been dredged up to justify its alleged policies, that it seems appropriate
to try to summarize aspects of its early history and justification for what
light may be shed on efforts to reform it. For years, judges and scholars
have pointed to the mischiefs that could be created not only by the "dead
hand" but by unforeseen applications of the Rule, so that the brilliant and
often seductive solutions suggested by the late W. Barton Leach and others
have been warmly embraced.' The Rule's "reign of terror" has been dram-
atized by situations ranging from the magic gravel pit to fertile octogenari-
ans. 2 Among the most popular of suggested reforms has been the so-called
"wait-and-see" rule-i.e., wait and see whether the available time of lives in
being and twenty-one years will in fact, rather than by possibility, violate
the Rule. That approach was enunciated by the Pennsylvania Legislature
in 1947, 3 and it has gained increasing plaudits and support. It now seems to
* Algernon Sydney Biddle Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
This Article is an entirely new revision of an Article by the Author published in the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review in 1977. Several excerpts from the earlier
Article are reprinted with permission.
1. See Br~gy, A Defense o(Pennsylvania's Statute on Perpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 313
(1949); Cohan, The Pennsylvania Wait-and-See Perpetuity Doctrine-New Kernalsfrom Old
Nutshells, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 321 (1955); Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massa-
chusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REv. 1349 (1954); Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REV. 683 (1958); Simes, Is the Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait-and-See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REV. 179 (1953);
Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 707 (1955); Waterbury,
Some Further Thoughts on Perpetuities Reform, 42 MINN. L. REV. 41 (1957).
2. See Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638, 643-45 (1938).
3. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 6104 (Purdon 1975).
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have received the approval of the second Restatement of Property,4 even
though most of the reporters have apparently forsaken their earlier explana-
tions of the origin and development of the Rule as a result of a recent study
of what Lord Nottingham probably had in mind when he first formulated
the Rule in the 1680's.'
This essay is not directly concerned with the wait-and-see rule as such,
even though it has been part of the battleground of reform proposals since
1959 when the late Professor Philip Mechem offered a devastating commen-
tary on its numerous supporters. 6 Although the current revision of the Re-
statement recognizes, at least implicitly, the error of its earlier
rationalization, most of the reporters evidently regard the wait-and-see rule
as advantageous and desirable.7 Others have suggested a variety of differ-
ent reforms' in their attempts to justify a policy of preventing property
from being tied up for too long a period by the hands of long-dead testators
and settlors. Yet few have recognized how well the old common law
worked, and why, even in situations not envisaged three hundred years ago.
A number of current proposals for reform are summarized in a recent
article in the Law Quarterl'y Review.' Useful as that article is in emphasizing
the benefits of certainty and predictability inherent in the old common law
Rule in contrast with recent proposals, it seems not to take into account
what Lord Nottingham was trying to do: to avoid inconvenience rather
than to enunciate a fixed and formalized rule. It is to summarize his efforts
and, by inference, to support the efficacy of the old Rule which, as it devel-
4. See generall RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1979).
5. See Haskins, Extending the Grasp of the Dead Hand." Reflections on the Origins of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 19 (1977).
6. Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 107 U.
PA. L. REV. 965 (1959).
7. For a number of authors supporting the wait-and-see doctrine, see note 1
supra. See also Deech, Lives in Being Revived, 97 L.Q. REV. 593 (1981). For statutory
provisions, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY §§ 1.2, 1.4 (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1979). See also id. §§ 1.2, 1.4 Reporter's Notes. But see id. Appendix (Tent. Draft
No. 1, 1978) (dissents).
8. See, e.g., R. MAUDSLEY, THE MODERN LAW OF PERPETUITIES (1979);
Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1255 (1960); Leach, Perpetuitlies:
Staying the Slaughter of the Innocents, 68 L.Q. REV. 35 (1952); Leach, Perpetuities in
Perspective: Endizg the Rule'r Reign of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721 (1952); Lynn,
Reforming the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 488 (1961);
Maudsley, Perpetuities: Reforming the Common-Law Rule-How to Wait and See, 60 COR-
NELL L.Q. 355 (1975); Maudsley, Measuring Lives Under a System of Wait-and-See, 86
L.Q. REV. 357 (1970); Morris & Wade, Perpetuities Reform at Last, 80 L'Q. REV. 486
(1964); Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait-and-See" Doctrine, 52
MICH. L. REV. 179 (1953). The recent literature is discussed in Deech, Lives in Being
Revived, 97 L.Q. REV. 593 (1981).
9. Deech, supra note 8.
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oped, was tied to family settlements, that this essay has been prepared. Al-
though a good deal of what follows draws upon the present author's earlier
and extended study,' its purpose is less to repeat than to emphasize the
circumstances under which the Rule was first enunciated, explain why it
was thought necessary, and appraise the prudent flexibility that it was then
intended to have in its application.
The oft-told and generally accepted tale of how the Rule Against Per-
petuities came about is simple, but obviously too simple. In 1620, the Court
of King's Bench unexpectedly declared in Pells v. Brown 11 that executory
interests were indestructible. Theretofore, and as recently as 1618,12 it had
been assumed that they were as destructible as contingent remainders, at
least by fine or recovery." A strong dissent by Judge Doderidge declared
that the decision in Pells would lead to "a mischievous kind of perpetuity
which could not by any means be destroyed,"' 4 and scarcely sixty years
later, in 1681, Lord Nottingham announced in his decision in The Duke of
Norfolk's Case 5 that an interest which could not take effect within at least
one life in being was void as a perpetuity. 6 Although Lord Nottingham's
decision was reversed in 1683,17 it was subsequently reaffirmed by the
House of Lords in 168518 and later became the foundation of the modern
Rule.
This over-simplified explanation of the origins of the Rule disregards
numerous factors, including notably the varying opinions of seventeenth
century judges as to whether the decision in Pells v. Brown was in fact law
because it was in direct contradiction to Child v. Baylie,' 9 decided two years
earlier.21 Moreover, what was a perpetuity became an issue that plagued
the judges until Lord Nottingham resolved it in terms of "inconvenience."
Of equal importance has been the predilection of modern writers to
read back into an earlier time modern social and economic ideas without
evaluating their historical applicability. Thus it is written: "Ever since...
[the Rule] first emerged in the Duke ofNorfolk's Case, it has been declared to
be a rule in furtherance of the alienability of property."2 1 According to this
view, a rule favoring alienability was necessary by the end of the seven-
teenth century because "perpetuities" impeded the development of the mer-
10. Haskins, supra note 5.
11. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep.'504 (1620).
12. See Child v. Baylie, 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618).
13. See J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 159 (4th ed. 1942).
14. Cro. Jac. 592, 79 Eng. Rep. at 506.
15. 3 Ch. Gas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1681).
16. Id. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953 (citing Wood v. Sanders, 1 Ch. Cas. 131, 22
Eng. Rep. 728 (1669)).
17. W. LEACH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS 752 (1940).
18. [1685] 3 Ch. Cas. 53.
19. 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (K.B. 1618).
20. See Haskins, supra note 5, at 36 nn. 59 & 60.
21. Simes, The Policy Against Perpetuities, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 708 (1955).
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cantile middle class by taking property out of the "stream of commerce. '" 22
In a society that has been portrayed as changing from a feudal to a capital-
ist order, the creation of a new rule restricting a landowner's ability to tie
up his lands would be perceived, not surprisingly, as proof of such a transac-
tion. Land, the source of all wealth in a pre-capitalist society, had to be
made more marketable. Once the major restraints on alienation were re-
moved, successful men would rise and the incompetent would fall, regard-
less of the efforts or the prominence of their ancestors. This perception of
the Rule as promoting a laissez-faire system is articulated in the first Re-
statement of Property: "It is obvious that limitations unalterably effective
over a long period of time would hamper the normal operation of the com-
petitive struggle. Persons less fit, less keen in the social struggle, might be
thereby enabled to retain property disproportionate to their skills in the
competitive struggle.",23
The traditional explanation of the Rule's origins is contradicted, how-
ever, by several compelling factors and is therefore ripe for re-examination.
Obviously, the modem common law rule, which states that an interest in
property is void unless it will necessarily vest, if at all, within a life in being
and twenty-one years,24 limits a testator's or grantor's ability to control the
future ownership of his land or other property. The rule that was first an-
nounced by Lord Nottingham in The Duke of Norfo/k's Case had a different
purpose. Then, in fact, it was called a rule of perpetuities, not a rule against
perpetuities. The Duke ofNorfoks Case was a clarification of ancient contra-
dictory assumptions, decisions, and uncertainties with respect to how long
interests in land might last. Moreover, the decision was not simply the reso-
lution of an arcane point of property law; the case marked the climax of a
long struggle between the conveyancers, who wanted more freedom for the
landed classes to control their estates, and the royal judges who had stood
firm against those efforts for centuries. The conclusion seems inescapable
that the conveyancers and their clients, not the judges, were the ultimate
victors.
This conclusion, which is contrary to traditional assumptions about the
origins and purposes of the Rule, is suggested by three related inquiries.
First, there is the question of interpreting the economic, social, and political
forces at work in seventeenth century England. A generation ago it was
fashionable to view this period as dominated by a rising middle class, wed-
ded to capitalist ideas such as free alienability of property. Now, however, a
new climate of opinion has emerged, and an increasing number of histori-
ans have accepted the theory that the dominant ethos of the seventeenth
22. Grimes, Runnymeade Revisited, 6 VAL. U.L. REv. 135, 136 (1972).
23. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note, at 2132 (1944).
24. The definitive modern version of the Rule was formulated by John Chip-
man Gray, the high priest of the Rule Against Perpetuities: "No interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest." J. GRAY, supra note 13, § 201, at 197.
[Vol. 48
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century was that prevailing in a landed class generally hostile to mercantile
or capitalist ideas. Such a class might be expected to take a jaundiced view
of the free alienability favored by eager merchants and city buyers. Second,
an examination of the law existing before the new Rule was adopted reveals
that the Rule did not limit a testator's or grantor's options but rather af-
forded him greater flexibility by enhancing his ability to control future
ownership of his property. Third, the facts of The Duke of Norfolk's Case
reveal the problems that faced a great landowner before he had the Rule to
rely on and how the Rule alleviated those problems. An examination of
these three lines of inquiry leads to a rejection of the traditional theory set
forth by the classic authorities.
II. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
The traditional theory about the origins of the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities was virtually unassailable a generation ago because it fitted nicely with
the accepted historical interpretation of seventeenth century England,
which was largely influenced by Marxist views.25 The Marxist interpreta-
tion of the social struggle of the 1640's was championed by R. H. Tawney, a
distinguished Socialist historian who was among those instrumental in de-
veloping a new social and economic historiography in Great Britain.26 Ac-
cording to Tawney, the Revolution in 1642 represented the triumph of the
emerging middle class's newer capitalist values over the older feudal struc-
ture. Tawney saw the gentry as a rural middle class rising against the in-
creasingly decrepit feudal ruling class of the aristocracy, and thus the
gentry, although a landed class, was given an unwarranted capitalist hue.2 7
The gentry's religion was Protestant, their political instincts were parlia-
mentary, and their economic views were mercantile or capitalist. These
words are, of course, only labels, but they serve to depict the Marxist per-
ception of a class that might be expected to include in its list of reforms a
rule that would tie the hands of great landed lords, who sought to protect
their estates from economic misfortunes that were overtaking them as a
class. When the triumph of this bourgeois gentry came, capitalist values
25. The Marxist analysis was itself a reaction to the Whig interpretation of
seventeenth century English history, which had emphasized the advancement of
political and religious liberty. Typical examples of Whig historiography include T.
MACAULAY, THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESSION OF JAMES THE
SECOND (1879); G. TREVELYAN, BRITISH HISTORY IN THE NINETEENTH CEN-
TURY, 1782-1901 (1922); G. TREVELYAN, THE Two PARTY SYSTEM IN ENGLISH
POLITICAL HISTORY (1926).
26. Tawney's economic analysis of the seventeenth century was put forward in
Tawney, The Rise ofthe Gentl,, 1558-1640, 11 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1941). His other
works include R. TAWNEY, THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM IN THE 16TH CENTURY
(1912); R. TAWNEY, HARRINGTON'S INTERPRETATION OF HIS AGE (1942); R. TAw-
NEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (1st ed. 1926).
27. See Tawney, The Rise of the Genty, supra note 26, at 12-18.
19831
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triumphed as well. Given the favor that this historical interpretation en-
joyed twenty-five years ago,2 8 the Rule, born in the early 1680's, explained
itself. The traditional theory of the Rule's origins matched and, therefore,
had to be correct.
Unfortunately, the traditional theory no longer fits. The Marxist inter-
pretation was flawed from the outset and was soon under attack. The first
assault came in 1953, when H. R. Trevor-Roper argued with great force
that the gentry was, in fact, a declining class of small landowners driven to
revolution by economic reverses and the sullen resentment of an increas-
ingly dominant court.29 Trevor-Roper's view was ultimately too extrava-
gant to be maintained, but it did illustrate the weakness of Tawney's
approach. A more persuasive argument was put forward by J. H. Hexter in
1961.30 Hexter was convincing on two points that were devastating to the
effort to describe the seventeenth century as a period of capitalist triumph.
First, he suggested that there was nothing unusual about the movement of
members of the middle or trading classes into the landed class: "From the
fourteenth century comes that classical example of the rise of the middle
class, the de la Poles who went from trade at Hull to the Earldom of Suffolk
in two generations." 3' Pointing to the Pastons, Caxtons, and Chaucers,
Hexter concluded: "And so back through the centuries, as far as the record
will take us, we find the rising middle class making its way out to the land,
buying estates from aristocrats too unlucky or thriftless to hold them."'3 2
The newly triumphant class of the seventeenth century was nothing new.
When new men did replace the old, they were generally replacing the
grandsons of men who had themselves been new.
Second, and more important, Hexter rejected the idea that the gentry,
however long they had been on the land, could be considered as anything
other than a landed class. The seventeenth century merchants who bought
land were diverting capital into an investment that promised no better than
a five percent return. Had they left their money in the city, they could have
been assured of a ten percent return.3 These individuals were willing to
accept a lesser income because they coveted the prestige that went with
land. The new men were more interested in behaving like landed gentle-
28. Tawney initially swept many before him, and many an article was devoted
to the influence the gentry had on politics, economics, and law. See, e.g., Stone, The
Anatomy of the Eliabethan Aristocracy, 18 ECON. HIST. REV. 1 (1948); Thorne, Tudor
Social Transfonnation and Legal Change, 26 N.Y.U. L. REV. 10 (1951).
29. H. TREVOR-ROPER, THE GENTRY 1540-1640 (1953).
30. J. HEXTER, The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England, in REAPPRAISALS
IN HISTORY 71 (1961); J. HEXTER, Storm Over the Gentcy, in REAPPRAISALS IN HIs-
TORY 117 (1961).
31. J. HEXTER, The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England, supra note 30, at
79.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 96.
[Vol. 48
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men than in earning the kind of profit that would lure a true capitalist.
The landed gentleman remained the ideal to which all propertied classes
aspired. The newly landed class was, on the whole, no more nouveau riche
than the aristocrats that Tawney would have us believe were their rivals.
Conrad Russell, another distinguished historian, has described the dif-
ficulties faced by those who differentiated the landed gentry from the
landed aristocracy:
In economic terms, both had the same relationship to the means
of production: they lived off the profits of landownership ....
[B]y any test which can be devised they must be regarded as being
of the same class. There is no justification for describing gentle-
men as "middle class." The term "middle class," and even more
the term "bourgeois," are urban ones, and are very hard to fit into
the class structure of rural England, in which people were either
gentlemen or not gentlemen.
34
If the rising class was neither particularly new nor particularly capitalist,
the basis for the traditional view of the Rule's origins becomes even more
doubtful. To this doubt must now be added two additional factors.
First, the work of the economic historians has not gone for naught. By
the early years of the seventeenth century the landed classes, regardless of
the values to which they aspired, were clearly undergoing considerable and
continuing economic upheaval. Whether rising or falling as individuals,
the members of the landed class as a whole were increasing in numbers.
Lawrence Stone has estimated a threefold increase between 1540 and 1640:
"The number of peers rose from 60 to 160; baronets and knights from 500 to
1,400; esquires from perhaps 800 to 3,000; and armigerous gentry from per-
haps 5,000 to 15,000.,,3' The growth of the landed classes, coupled with the
availability of land that resulted from the confiscation of the monasteries
and the frequent sale of crown lands to finance foreign adventures, resulted
in a highly speculative land market. The market peaked between 1615 and
1620,36 but the activity is illustrative of the economic insecurity of the entire
period. Stone concluded that "[a] landed aristocracy has rarely had it so
bad."
37
The crux of both Stone's and Hexter's analyses is that the landed fami-
lies were having great difficulty in holding on to their estates. The instabil-
ity of the families themselves is reflected by the fact that of the sixty-three
noble families existing in 1559, only one-third had lasted without total or
partial failure of succession on the eve of the civil war in 1641 .38 Those
34. C. RUSSELL, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTS 17-18 (1971).
35. L. STONE, THE CAUSES OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION, 1529-1642, at 72
(1972).
36. Id. at 73.
37. L. STONE, THE CRISIS OF THE ARISTOCRACY, 1558-1641, at 94 (abr. ed.
1967).
38. Id. at 79.
1983]
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families that did not suffer from too few children often had too many, and
daughters were particularly unwelcome in light of the increasing expenses
of marriage.3 9 Stone points to the failure of landed fathers to provide for
their families as one of the reasons for the insecurity associated with the
troubled land market. In addition, "legal obstacles to breaking entails and
selling land were exceptionally weak, and moral objections to the dismem-
berment of the family patrimony exceptionally feeble."40
The second consideration that must be evaluated is the date of the
Rule itself. Although the great debate over the gentry has concentrated on
the economic instability of the pre-civil war period, the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities was propounded in 1681, well after the Cromwellian revolution. The
political mood of this later period was distinctly conservative. After the
restoration of Charles II to the throne in 1660, the landed classes entered a
period of relative stability and confidence. There was still considerable
political turmoil,4 1 but the dominant sentiment was Tory. The Tory phi-
39. Id. at 81.
40. Id. at 94. Hexter, relying on an earlier work of Stone's, described the moral
decline of one seventeenth century family:
Consider the sad case of Toby Palavicino. He inherited one of the most
magnificent landed fortunes in Cambridgeshire. His rake's progress from
the time he came into his own to the time he lay "in the Fleet for debts"
took sixteen years, but then Toby was handicapped. His prudent father
had laid an entail on the estate, and Toby was put to all the bother of
getting an Act of Parliament passed to break it. Had it not been for this
tiresome hindrance, he might have made it to jail several years sooner.
J. HEXTER, The Myth of the Middle Class in Tudor England, supra note 30, at 93. The
Palavicino case is an interesting one because the prudent father who sought to use
the entail to tie up his property was not an heir of an established family but a self-
made Elizabethan financier and alum trade monopolist who had finally ascended
into the landed class. His urban, mercantile background did not carry with it any
loathing of entails; quite the contrary, rather than seeking a device to enhance the
alienability of his land, Palavicino Sr., like any great landowner, sought to save his
vast wealth from the irresponsibility of a reckless son. It is not clear why an act of
Parliament was required to break the entail, which normally could be barred by a
recovery, unless the property was in trust and the trustees could not join without a
breach of trust. See generally L. STONE, AN ELIZABETHAN: SIR HORATIO
PALAVICINO (1956).
41. The reigns of Charles II and James II, lasting jointly from 1660 until 1689,
were in fact noted for considerable political debate and for the development of a
two party system. The Whig Party, generally tied to the older parliamentary tradi-
tion of Cromwell's Roundheads, was an amalgam of dissenting religious groups,
political liberals, merchant interests, and out of favor courtiers. See generally J.
JONES, THE FIRST WHIGS (1961). The Tory Party, dominant in the seventeenth
century, was Royalist, strongly Anglican, and landed. See generally K. FEILING, A
HISTORY OF THE TORY PARTY 1640-1714 (1924). For a good general work on the
political, and non-political, conflicts of the period, see D. OGG, ENGLAND IN THE
REIGN OF CHARLES II (2d ed. 1956).
[Vol. 48
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losophy was pro-monarchy, but the King's cause was not its sole or even its
pre-eminent guiding star. The Tory's first loyalty was to the Church of
England, and the political crises of the Restoration Parliament were gener-
ally the result of royal efforts to tamper with the established religion.42 In
addition, the Tory was generally a landed gentleman, with little love for
merchants, the city of London, or capitalism. Even the Marxist historians
have never attempted to depict these men as capitalists. Yet the liberal
ideas which the Marxist-oriented historians sought to ascribe to a rising
middle class were in fact tied to the makers of the Revolution of 1642, who
were predominantly members of dissenting religious sects and held more
liberal political views.43 The Tories of the post-revolutionary period were
the reaction to the Cromwellian revolution, and one of these men, a pros-
perous Kent landowner, the Earl of Nottingham, first enunciated the Rule
Against Perpetuities.
The Rule therefore seems to be the work not of incipient capitalists but
of landed gentlemen anxious to preserve the positions of their families in a
society that had recently passed through a turbulent period. If this expla-
nation of the Rule's origins is correct, the question remains why the landed
gentry should want a rule against perpetuities. Would they not prefer a rule
that might give a landed gentleman a little more freedom to tie up land?
Clearly they would, and that is precisely what Lord Nottingham gave them
in The Duke of Norfolk'r Case.
III. THE LAW BEFORE 1681
The importance of land in the history of England and English law
continued to grow from the Middle Ages until at least the end of the eight-
eenth century. In the beginning, land was the basis of economic subsis-
tence, wealth, family solidarity, social status, and, above all, security.
Feudal doctrine prescribed that land should be held of an overlord, and
ultimately of the king, so that rules with respect to its transfer and descent
tended to reflect policies of the crown embodied in the common law of the
king's courts. It fell to the royal courts to formulate rules that sought to
balance the conflicting interests and desires of the king and of his powerful
landed subjects, who had a strong and ingrained sense of what they should
42. Modern historians have persuasively demonstrated that Tory opinion was
separable from Royalist opinion, and that it was the Tory majority in the House of
Commons that rejected royal attempts at religious toleration, first in 1660-1661,
and then more decisively in 1673. Tory hostility to Catholicism led to the tempo-
rary decline of the party in the wake of the Popish Plot hysteria and to a momen-
tary majority for the Whigs in 1679-1681. In light of the Tory hostility to toleration
of either Catholicism or dissenting Protestantism, the effort of James II to tolerate
both groups resulted, not surprisingly, in the overthrow of the Stuarts. For the best
discussion of the Tory point of view, see D. WITCOMBE, CHARLES II AND THE CAV-
ALIER HOUSE OF COMMONS 1663-1674 (1966).
43. G. DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS, 1603-1660, at 127-30 (2d ed. 1959).
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be permitted to do with, and how they might dispose of, their land and
property rights. The rules that restrained the landowners, however, were
rigid and sometimes complex. Occasionally they required modification, as
by the Statute De Donis," which created the fee tail in 1285.
Although the royal judges often declared that land should be freely
alienable, alienability was limited by a recognized calculus of estates that
had evolved well before the end of the reign of Edward I in 1307. By the
end of the thirteenth century, a man could typically convey freehold land in
the form of a life estate, a fee tail, or a fee simple. Also, a grantor might
retain the underlying seisin and future right to repossession but convey the
possession of the land for a term of years gratis or for a stated rent. Within
this calculus, however, there were restrictions on the conditions a man could
impose on the grantee of his land. Some of these restrictions resulted from
incapacities of thought connected with the elusive concept of seisin,4 5 while
others resulted from royal policies hostile to the accumulation of large es-
tates which, as the basis for private armies, might threaten the power of the
king.46 Paradoxically, the first major challenge to the free alienability of
land came when the Statute De Donis created a new estate that was in the
beginning not truly alienable, the fee tail. The fee tail became unbarrable
and could be conveyed by one in possession for his life only; then it would
pass in any event successively to the family of the original grantee, genera-
tion after generation, until the lines ran out. The statutory unbarrable fee
tail replaced the fee simple conditional,4 7 and it lasted for nearly two centu-
ries, despite grave dissatisfactions and attempts to circumvent it. Increas-
ingly during those years the problem became the practical one of
marketability: a grantee might take land in good faith, believing it to be
freely alienable as a fee simple, only to discover subsequently that it had
been entailed several generations back, that the lineal descendents of a prior
44. Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 13 Edw., ch. 1 (1285).
45. See text accompanying note 56 infa.
46. The protection of the king's interests played a major role in the develop-
ment of a rule against perpetuities. The greatest danger faced by many medieval
kings was the over-mighty subject and the preservation in perpetuity of a single
family's financial base in land and men that might raise up a power capable of
challenging the Crown itself. The king's own financial interests were at stake as
well. A perpetuity kept land out of the market and discouraged trade, thus limiting
the king's revenues and taxes on the one hand and diminishing productivity on the
other. 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 759(1) (1971). More impor-
tant, a real perpetuity-which prevented or seriously curtailed alienation-would
deprive the king of the feudal incidents that were so vital to the royal treasury. This
was Bacon's argument against perpetuities in Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a, 76 Eng.
Rep. 270 (1595).
47. The courts had declared the fee simple conditional to be freely alienable
after the birth of issue. I RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 70 (1936). The process by
which the fee tail became unbarrable is described in 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A His-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 115-18 (1935).
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grantee had died out, and that now a valid claim might be asserted by the
heirs of the reversioner or remainderman under the original grant. Appar-
ently, so much of the land in England had been tied up in entails of this sort
that it became unsafe to take a conveyance lest one lose it in this manner.
4 8
The judges solved this problem in Taltarum-s Case49 through a judicially
recognized fiction which permitted a tenant in tail to break the entail, to-
gether with ensuing remainders and reversions, by "suffering a recovery. ''
Through the device of the common recovery the fee tail became freely
alienable by the person in possession, and that person could effectively con-
vey an estate in fee simple absolute.5
Under the Tudors, landowners and their increasingly imaginative con-
veyancers were persistent in their efforts to establish long-lasting settlements
of land, often by attempting variations on the basic fee tail. One such effort
was the attempt to resurrect the unbarrable fee tail by adding a condition
to the effect that any attempt to break the fee tail would immediately termi-
nate the estate of the person attempting the disentailment. These convey-
ances were held invalid in several decisions in the early seventeenth century
as repugnant to the fee tail; they were even described as perpetuities be-
cause, if given effect, the fee tail might then last forever-a continuity
whose existence belonged only to God.52 Another example of the effort to
circumvent the vulnerability of the fee tail was the creation of an equivalent
to the estate tail in a long term for years. Unfortunately for the landowners,
the courts struck down this device at an early date, declaring that a term for
years could not be entailed and that the first taker became the owner of the
entire term.
53
At about the time that Taltarum's Case dealt a blow to the fee tail as a
48. See I RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY Appendix (1936) (dower rights).
49. 12 Edw. IV 19, pl 25 (1472). Ingenious lawyers had earlier discovered
other methods of evading De Donis in certain situations. See 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 47, at 118-20.
50. For a concise explanation of the procedure of the common recovery, see A.
CASNER & W. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 256 n.13 (2d ed. 1969).
51. Talarum's Case is important because, just as the mortmain acts of the time
of Edward I sought to keep the Church from accumulating large areas of land, the
development of the common recovery was similarly inspired by the growing concen-
tration of great estates in the hands of powerful families. After Tallarums Case, the
fee tail could in theory last forever in the heirs of the owner to whom it was sold or
given, but at any time the current owner might suffer a common recovery and
thereby transfer the land back into the mainstream of commerce.
52. See Corbet's Case, 1 Co. 83b, 21 Eng. Rep. 985 (1599), quoted in G. CARY,
REPORTS OR CAUSES IN CHANCERY 11 (1820).
53. Sanders v. Cornish, Cro. Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631). By the end of
the sixteenth century the conveyancers, spurred on by their worried landed employ-
ers, sought to create unbarrable entails through a clause of cesser. Gray notes an
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device for tying up land, a second major threat to ready marketability
arose. Assisted by the new types of estates made possible by the Statute of
Uses54 in 1535, conveyancers had also begun to tie up land through contin-
gent remainders. Conveyances of successive interests to living persons-
characteristically, vested remainders or reversions following estates for life
or in fee tail-were countenanced in the middle ages. Six hundred years
ago, these basic future interests, which took effect whenever and however
the immediately preceding estate ended and had no other condition, were
viewed as present interests with enjoyment postponed.
It was otherwise with remainders granted on a contingency to an unas-
certained person. Contingent remainders were indeed future interests, but
the law gave them scant recognition until the sixteenth century,55 for it was
not perceived how an owner could be seised of such a freehold interest if he
were unknown or if a condition were attached to his taking it. From this
conception there developed two related rules, fortified by such other consid-
erations as the strong preference for alienability. It became law that a con-
tingent remainder in realty, unless in trust and hence equitable, was subject
to destruction if the condition attached to it had not been satisfied at the
termination of the preceding or "supporting" freehold estate, typically a life
estate. Even though the condition might subsequently be met or the
There is started up a device called perpetuity; which is an entail with
an addition of a proviso conditional tied to his estates, not to put away the
land from the next heir; and, if he do, to forfeit his own estate. Which
perpetuities, if they should stand, would bring in all the former inconven-
iences of entails that were cut off ....
J. GRAY, supra note 13, § 141.2 (quoting 7 BACON'S WORKS 491 (Spedding ed.
1859)). The courts were not fooled, however, and Professor Yale has suggested that
they had disposed of this threat by Coke's time. I LORD NOTrINGHAM'S CHAN-
CERY CASES lxxiv (D. Yale ed. 1957). See Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. 35a, 77
Eng. Rep. 976 (1614); Corbet's Case, I Co. 83b, 21 Eng. Rep. 985 (1599).
Notwithstanding the legal thrust and counterthrust that surrounded the fee
tail, the landowners were aware that the law was doing their work. If many a
landed gentleman wished to guard against the mismanagement of a foolish heir,
most of them also realized that a genuine perpetuity posed the danger of depriving
a family of economic flexibility in selling land when changing economic circum-
stances required re-investment or ready cash. The worries created by the spectre of
a genuine perpetuity, such as an unbarrable entail, are reflected in a bill brought in
the House of Commons in 1597 which found that such perpetuities
engender discorde in all families where they light and drawe the whole
kindred into faction, but doe also make Children disobedient and parents
unnatural . . . . [M]any purchasers are often and usually defrauded by
such. . . [perpetuities] and the owners of inheritance of landes restrayned
from raysinge money by sales or from exchanginge Lands for lands uppon
any occasion whatsoever. . ..
Holdsworth, An Elizabethan Bill Against Perpetuities, 35 L.Q. REv. 25B. 258 (1919).
54. 27 Hen. 8, ch. 10 (1535).
55. See J. GRAY, supra note 13, §§ 134-135.
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grantee might later be identified, the common law refused to tolerate a gap
in seisin. This reasoning required what has been referred to as natural de-
structibility.5 6 Only those holding an estate for life, in fee tail, or fee simple,
could be seised. The rule had evolved from the practicalities of the feudal
system, which demanded that someone should always be seised or "sitting
upon" the land to be responsible for feudal dues. But the reasons for the
rule had become encysted in the tissues of judicial thought, and, aided by
conceptions favorable to freer alienability, the rule was relentlessly applied.
Conveyancers who hoped that an equitable contingent remainder, trans-
formed by the Statute of Uses into a corresponding legal estate, would be
indestructible were dismayed to find the judges deciding that those remain-
ders were equally subject to destruction.5 7 Similarly, after the Statute of
Uses the same pressures in favor of alienability, supported by convictions as
to the fragility of non-vested remainders, permitted contingent remainders
to be destroyed by a conveyance from a life tenant to the owner of the next
vested estate, usually the reversioner. This squeezed out the intervening
contingent remainder if the condition had not yet been met. The process,
known as merger, is referred to as artificial destructibility.5"
To be safe from the common law rules that continued to emphasize the
anachronistic concept of seisin, a seventeenth century landowner might
convey land to trustees in such a way that the Statute of Uses would not
transform the equitable interest into a corresponding legal estate. This
could be done, for example, by conveying the interest with active duties.
Seisin would be in the trustees, and the gaps in seisin, fatal at law, were
immaterial in equity insofar as the equitable contingent remainder was con-
cerned. Apparently, however, landowners were reluctant to give up the
legal ownership of property and transfer it to trustees, for they then would
lack the power to break the trust and sell the property, either to profit from
a rising market or to meet current financial needs. Nevertheless, the trust
device was there, and it continued to be a potential threat to free alienabil-
ity of land insofar as the two rules of destructibility were concerned. As will
appear, conveyancers in the seventeenth century turned to the use of terms
for years, which allowed their clients to retain the basic seisin and yet create
future interests-whether absolutely or, more usually, in trust-within a
term for years.
By the early seventeenth century the struggle for free alienability had
met with considerable success.5 9 Destructibility of fees tail by common re-
56. See, e.g., White v. Summers, [1908] 2 Ch. 256.
57. See Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (1595).
58. See, e.g., Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wins. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1670).
59. Other evidence of legal rules favoring free alienability can be found in the
articulation of a rule recognized in 1225 in D'Arundel's Case, reprinted in 3
BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK, case 1054 (F. Maitland ed. 1887), and canonized in Shel-
ley's Case, 1 Co. 93b, 76 Eng. Rep. 206 (1581). The Rule in Shelley's Case pre-
scribed that in certain situations a conveyance to a grantee for life and then to his
19831
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covery and of legal contingent remainders by merger and failure to vest had
become so effective a weapon that it was fast becoming a rule against perpe-
tuities itself, particularly because certain of the new types of legal executory
interests made possible by the Statute of Uses were considered destructible
as contingent remainders.60 But quite unexpectedly, in 1620, the Court of
King's Bench re-emphasized in Pdls v. Brown6' that there was a generic and
not merely a verbal distinction between executory interests and contingent
remainders. The court held that an executory interest had been created
and could not be destroyed, despite a dissenting judge's strongly worded
prediction that the decision would lead to a "mischievous kind of
perpetuity. ' 62 It should be emphasized that for these purposes the word
perpetuity connoted an inconvenient fettering of property in the sense that
the interest created in a grantee might be inalienable for too long a time.
63
The result of Pdls v. Brown was truly revolutionary, and it gave the
conveyancers much more flexibility to control the future ownership of land
than they had possessed since Taltarumrs Case. The dissenting judge, Doder-
idge, may have overstated his position with respect to perpetuities, perhaps
because he thought any abandonment of the principle of destructibility of
future interests, whether by common recovery or by merger and failure to
vest, was a surrender to the concept of a perpetuity. Yet the grantor in Pells
had not tied up his land perpetually. He had limited a grantee's power to
dispose of the land on two conditions, either of which would necessarily be
satisfied within the life or lives of two named living persons, both within the
same generation in the family.
Paralleling the development that culminated in Pells v. Brown was an-
other that climaxed in Manningr Case64 in 1609. Before Manning-r Case was
decided, the owner of a term for years who attempted to divide the term
into a life estate in one person and what appeared to be a remainder in
another would find that the remainder was void. The conception of free-
hold estates and the dignity that lay behind that conception was, roughly
speaking, that a life estate engulfed a term for years; therefore, the effect of
the pre-1609 view was that the life tenant owned the entire term, and after
heirs gave the grantee not a life estate and a remainder in unascertained heirs, but a
remainder in himself and hence, by merger, a fee simple. A comparable rule
emerged from the doctrine of worthier title. See 3 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
§ 314(1) (1940).
60. See J. GRAY, supra note 13, § 159. Devices for tying up land had not been
disposed of altogether, however. The use of trusts was possible, although this could
require transfer of the seisin as well. After the Statute of Uses it was possible as well
to create contingent remainders after a term of years, but they were recognized only
as springing executory interests.
61. Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620).
62. Id. at 592, 79 Eng. Rep. at 506.
63. 4 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY Part 1, Introductory Note (1944). See T.
SCRuTrON, LAND IN FETTERS 123-33 (1886).
64. 8 Co. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (1609).
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his death, he might provide for the disposition of whatever remained of the
term. A grantor was thus not permitted to fetter alienability even within a
term for years.
In Manning-s Case the judges of the Court of Common Pleas considered
whether Edward Manning could leave an interest in a fifty-year term to his
wife, Mary, and then to Matthew Manning. They decided that the life
tenant did have a complete interest in the term under the traditional analy-
sis, but it was subject to the condition that upon Mary's death Matthew's
interest was not a void remainder but a valid executory interest. Even
though Manning's Case involved a leasehold interest in a term for years, a
chattel real rather than real property, conveyancers seized on the decision
as providing a method of tying up their clients' land. A freehold owner
might theoretically create a 500-year term in one person with succeeding
indestructible executory interests in others in such a manner as to fetter the
land until the full expiration of 500 years. In fact, so long a term was very
unusual; the commonplace grant seems to have been a term that would last
for the lives of several named individuals and shift successively as executory
interests on conditions operative at the deaths of one or more of those
persons.
6 5
Gray has pointed out6 6 in his review of decisions concerning perpetu-
ities in the eighty years preceding The Duke of Norok's Case that with two
exceptions6 7 all the decisions relating to the growth of the Rule Against
Perpetuities involved terms for years and not freehold estates. Hence, the
conveyancers' chosen arena became one in which they had greater apparent
ability to tie up land. This was their "out" after Pells v. Brown.
Several reasons may be advanced for the increasing use of terms for
years rather than freehold estates by conveyancers as a technique of estate
planning. First, considerable doubt persisted as to the soundness of Pells v.
Brown-not only among conveyancers but among the judges. The case was
a sudden and unexpected departure from pre-existing law, which had con-
sidered executory interests to be as freely destructible as contingent remain-
ders.' To hold that an executory interest could not be barred by a
recovery "went down with the Judges like chopped hay."'69 Chief Justice
Treby noted that "these executory devises had not been long countenanced
when the Judges repented them; and if it were to be done again, it would
never prevail.",70 After Manning's Case, executory interests within a term for
65. See generaly J. GRAY, supra note 13, §§ 161-168.
66. Id. § 160.
67. Taylor v. Biddal, 2 Mod. 289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1678); Snowe v. Cuttler,
1 Lev. 135, 1 Keb. 752, 83 Eng. Rep. 335 (1664). See J. GRAY, supra note 13, §§ 165,
172.
68. See J. GRAY, supra note 13, § 121.7.
69. Scattergood v. Edge, 12 Mod. 278, 281, 88 Eng. Rep. 1320, 1322 (1699).
70. Id. at 287, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1326.
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years would not be destructible 7' or even void, and clearly were not de-
structible by analogy to freehold estates since in the case of a term the seisin
lay with the remainder or the reversioner.
A second possible reason for the growing use of terms and future inter-
ests within them may relate to the fact that the reversioner who created the
term usually retained the fee in himself, as well as the title deeds, which
enabled him to sell or mortgage the basic title subject to the outstanding
possessory rights of the owners of the term.
In The Duke of Norfolk'r Case, Sir Orlando Bridgman used the device of
a term for years followed by an indestructible executory interest when he
drafted the trust indenture to dispose of the barony of Grostock. Bridgman
undoubtedly used this method with a certain degree of confidence, born of
his experience as a conveyancer and the sturdiness of the precedents that
followed Manning'r Case, even though he had invented, at about the same
time, the so-called trust to preserve contingent remainders. Bridgman
would have been somewhat surprised, had he lived, at the extent to which a
seemingly straightforward trust instrument was expanded into one of the
truly important cases of English legal history.
IV. THE DUKE OF NORFOLK'S CASE
As previously noted, the judges of the king's courts had been fighting
against perpetuities long before the first enunciation of a rule of perpetuities
in The Duke of Norfolk'r Case. The principal weapons they had at hand were
the destructibility of fees tail by the common recovery and of contingent
remainders by merger and failure to vest. The early seventeenth century
had produced decisions that seriously weakened the effectiveness of these
weapons, principally the decision in Pells v. Brown and subsequent cases
which held that executory interests were indestructible. Not only were
these decisions unpopular with many of the judges, 72 they caused considera-
ble confusion in the legal profession concerning the state of the law. 73 By
1681, both conveyancers and judges were unhappy with the law as it then
71. For a discussion of Manning's Case, see text accompanying notes 64-65 supra.
See also J. GRAY, supra note 13, § 152.
72. Pells v. Brown and Mannng4s Case were obviously the two most troublesome
precedents. Other decisions are cited in J. GRAY, supra note 13, §§ 121.7, 161-168.
73. In Snowe v. Cuttler, 1 Lev. 135, 83 Eng. Rep. 335 (1664), the judges seem
to have been in great doubt, yet they did agree that an executory devise "may well
be allowed to take place within the compass of a life, but not after a dying without
issue, for that would make a perpetuity." Id. at 136, 83 Eng. Rep. at 336. One of
the judges stated that "if an ordinary contingency. . . may determine within one
life, or such time, it's good." 2 Keb. at 300, 84 Eng. Rep. at 187. It is not clear from
the report whether dying without issue was intended to mean definite failure of
issue, which should not have presented a perpetuity problem under the old law, or
indefinite failure, which would have presented a perpetuity under the law before
The Duke of Norfol-k' Case.
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stood, and both groups found in the 1647 trust indentures of the Earl of
Arundel a case that seemed certain to resolve the question that divided
them: the definition of what constituted a perpetuity.
Briefly the case was this. The Earl of Arundel and Surrey created two
trust indentures that were to provide for his family and, more particularly,
to guard against the consequences of the insanity of his eldest son,
Thomas. 74 After reserving life estates to himself for life and then to his
widow, the Earl gave the named trustees a term of 200 years, followed by
remainders to his younger children. Under the trust the term, or more
practically the income derived from the barony of Grostock, was to go to
the Earl's second son, Henry, and his issue during the life of the eldest son,
Thomas; but if Thomas should die without leaving issue in the lifetime of
Henry and if, further, Henry should become the Earl by inheritance, Henry
was to have no further rights to the rents and profits, which were then to go
to the third son, Charles. These, in simplest form, were the limitations of
the trust: an absolute equitable interest in the term in Henry75 followed by
what Lord Nottingham called a springing executory interest in Charles,
conditioned on the happening of two events which would have to occur
within Charles's life if he were to take anything.76
When in due course Henry succeeded to the Earldom and became
Duke of Norfolk, he suffered a common recovery in an effort to terminate
his brother Charles's interest. Charles then brought a bill in Chancery to
demand the benefit of the term because the specified conditions to his tak-
ing had been fulfilled. The new Duke resisted the claim on the ground that
the gift to Charles was in the nature of a perpetuity and hence void. This
was the issue presented to Lord Chancellor Nottingham to decide: was the
gift to Charles a perpetuity? If so, Henry could lawfully retain the interest
in the barony of Grostock given him by his father's trust, because the gift to
Charles was void.
The issue that divided the judges in this case was not whether perpetu-
74. The contingency of the insane Thomas having issue, which troubled the
Earl of Arundel, posed no problem for his second son: at the death of his father,
Henry arranged to have his elder brother locked up in Padua under circumstances
where he was certain not to have an heir. Henry did provide one benefit for his
unfortunate sibling. He secured a special act of Parliament restoring to the
Howards the family title of "Duke of Norfolk" which had been lost a few genera-
tions earlier. Thomas thus became a titled prisoner, and at his death his brother
Henry became Duke of Norfolk. Barry, The .Duke of Norfolk's Case, 23 VA. L. REV.
538, 543-45 (1937).
75. There could be no fee tail in a term. Although the first limitation to Henry
and the male heirs of his body may have been an attempt to create the equivalent
of a fee tail male in personal property, Henry took an absolute interest and Charles
a succeeding executory interest.
76. There were successive contingent remainders to other younger brothers,
which need not concern us here, and which were in any event held invalid by both
Lord Nottingham and the common law judges. See Barry, supra note 74, at 546-47.
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ities should be allowed, but what perpetuities were, or more exactly,
whether this case presented a perpetuity. On one side it could be argued
that the contingency upon which the disposition of the property turned was
certain to happen within a short period of time, so it was foolish to refer to
the gift as a perpetuity. On the other side, it might be argued that the type
of interest created should be found destructible, since otherwise the all-im-
portant preference for free alienability would be compromised. This second
argument, the traditional approach to perpetuities, convinced the common
law judges whom Lord Chancellor Nottingham consulted. But the first
argument convinced the Chancellor. It supplied ground for his decision
and, in addition, became the basis for the modern Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. Nevertheless, the argument between the two perceptions of what con-
stituted a perpetuity runs through the entire case.
Charles's claim was a sympathetic one, particularly in light of the obvi-
ous intent of his father, but most of the lower court judges who first heard
the case in 1677 thought that Charles's interest was void. Any effort to link
the opinions of the various judges, prior to and during 1681, with their
economic and political views is difficult. All of them were landed gentle-
men from prominent families. The issue therefore seems to have been ap-
proached less from a political than from a legal and practical standpoint.
When the case finally came before the Chancellor in 1681, he was so con-
scious of its importance that he called the three chief judges of the common
law courts to advise him. 7 They, too, were landed gentry, but all three
opposed his position that Charles's interest was valid.
The uncertainty that beclouded the opinions of the judges as to what
constituted a perpetuity is evidenced by the opposition of the three common
law judges in The Duke of Aorfolk's Case to Lord Nottingham's decision, and
by the fact that before Nottingham was finally affirmed by the House of
Lords in 1685, he was reversed in 1683. The unsettled state of the law pre-
vailing in the decades before 1681, and the misunderstanding and inconsis-
tencies of the judges' thinking, are perhaps best illustrated by the separate
opinions of the three common law judges whom Lord Nottingham asked to
be associated with him in The Duke of Norfolk's Case. As stated, all three
disagreed with him on various grounds, with varying degrees of competence
and understanding.
All three of these reliable Tory judges were unwilling to allow Charles
to take under the trust indentures because they would not abandon ancient
ideas about destructibility. Lord North, Chief Justice of the Court of Com-
mon Pleas, said little, and seems to have understood even less.7 8 But Sir
Francis Pemberton of the Court of King's Bench, and Sir William
Montagu, Lord Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, clearly saw the
77. The importance of the case cannot be overstated. Nottingham noted that
"there are so many Short-hand Writers, that nothing can pass from us here, but it is
presently made publick." 3 Ch. Cas. at 38, 22 Eng. Rep. at 954.
78. Id. at 20, 22 Eng. Rep. at 943 (opinion of Lord Chief Justice North).
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issue. They were being asked to abandon the principle of destructibility by
common recovery, one of the traditional checks on perpetuities, and they
were unwilling to do so. Montagu was the most direct: "[I]f such Limita-
tions over were permitted, it would create Perpetuities, which the Law doth
abhor." 79 Two strong precedents, Sanders v. Cornish " and Child v. Baylie,81
had rejected limitations turning on a "meer Contingency."8 2 Moreover, ac-
cording to Montagu, the precedents pointing the other way were simply
wrong. Montagu argued that Pells v. Brown had been controverted byJay v.
Jay83 where, he said, the judge did "confess Pell and Brown's Case to be
adjudged quite contrary to what he argued, yet he tells you, that the Judges
did find such Inconveniences arisen upon it." 4  Accept Pells, argued
Montagu, and the ancient legal policy against the tying up of land had to
be abandoned:
Admit that Case to be good Law, where will you stop, if you ad-
mit the Limitation of a Term after an Estate-tail, where shall it
end? For if after one, it may as well be after two; and if after two,
then as well after twenty; for it may be said, if he die within
twenty Years without Issue, and so if within 100, and there will be
no End; and so a Perpetuity will follow.
8 5
Pemberton agreed with Montagu, although he would have allowed
these particular limitations if created by two separate terms.8 6 He too was
conscious of the earlier successes of the conveyancers, and was especially
eloquent in his reaction to Manning's Case:
It was not foreseen nor thought, when that Judgment was given,
what would be the Consequence when once there was an Allow-
ance of the Limitation of a Term after the Death of a Person;
presently it was discerned, there was the same Reason for after
twenty Mens Lives as after one; and so then it was held and
agreed, that so long as the Limitation exceeded not Lives in Being
at the Creation of the Estate, it should extend so far. . . .and
now if this be admitted, no Man can foresee what an ill Effect
such an ill Allowance might have there, might such Limitations
come in as would incumber Estates and mightily entangle
Lands.8
7
If there is a central theme to the three judges' dissents, it seems to stem
from the case of Child v. Baylie,8 8 first decided in 1618. The case is impor-
79. Id. at 17, 22 Eng. Rep. at 941 (opinion of Baron Montagu).
80. Cro. Car. 280, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631).
81. 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618).
82. 3 Ch. Cas. at 18, 22 Eng. Rep. at 941 (opinion of Baron Montagu).
83. Style 258, 274, 82 Eng. Rep. 692, 706 (1651).
84. 3 Ch. Cas. at 19, 22 Eng. Rep. at 942 (opinion of Baron Montagu).
85. Id. at 19, 22 Eng. Rep. at 942-43 (opinion of Baron Montagu).
86. Id. at 23, 22 Eng. Rep. at 945 (opinion of Lord Chief Justice Pemberton).
87. Id. at 25, 22 Eng. Rep. at 946 (opinion of Lord Chief Justice Pemberton).
88. 79 Eng. Rep. 393 (1618).
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tant because of its similarity to the interests created by the 1647 trust inden-
ture of the Duke of Norfolk. In Child v. Bayz'e, a term of years was
bequeathed to X, but if X died without issue living at his death, then the
term was to go to Y. Referring to the ghost of perpetuities, the Court of
King's Bench decided that Y's interest was void, despite the fact that it
would necessarily take effect within X's life. When the case later came
before the Exchequer Chamber in 1623, the judges held, with one strong
dissent, that the gift was no different from the entailing of a term, which
was void as a perpetuity. r's interest again was held void. Only the strong
bias against perpetuities or ignorance of the law could have produced this
result in the face of counsel's argument that the devise was not a fee tail
since the second interest was to take effect upon the death of X with no
living issue.
Child v. Baylie was the authority, despite many contrary decisions
which succeeded it, for judges who wished to hew to the line favoring maxi-
mum alienability and hence maximum destructibility. This was the posi-
tion of the three dissenting judges. They did not prevail because Lord
Chancellor Nottingham, who had the only vote that counted, found the
conveyancers' logic more convincing.
Few better examples of the late seventeenth century Tory can be found
than Heneage Finch, Earl of Nottingham and father of the Rule Against
Perpetuities. He came from a family of solid Kent gentry, whose senior
branch had bought its way into the peerage during the inflation of honors
under the early Stuarts. Heneage, a son of the cadet branch of the family,
married the daughter of a London merchant, Elizabeth Harvey. During
the Restoration he sat in Parliament, first for Canterbury and then for Ox-
ford University. Both seats were reliably Tory, and Finch's devotion to An-
glicanism won him the title of "outstanding Churchman of the
Convention" from Sir Keith Feiling, the Tory Party's historian."9 Finch's
political positions were in keeping with his party's reputation. He generally
supported the Royal Court but was swept up in the anti-Catholic enthusi-
asm of the Popish Plot.' In 1680 he sentenced Lord Stafford, the aging
uncle of Henry and Charles Howard, to death for his alleged 'role in the
plot. Nottinghamn's staunch Anglicanism had earlier led him to oppose the
King in the crisis year of 1673, when Charles sought to win religious tolera-
tion for those who were not members of the Church of England. 9' By 1681,
89. K. FEILING, supra note 41, at 103.
90. See H. HoRwITz, REVOLUTION POLITICK.S: THE CAREER OF DANIEL
FINCH, SECOND EARL OF NOTINGHAM, 1647-1730, at 12 (1968).
91. Daniel, the Earl's son, clearly opposed toleration. Id. at 9. According to
Campbell, Nottingham himself once offended Charles II by referring to the "Royal
Coup" of 1673 in a speech to the Commons. 4J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHAN-
CELLORS OF ENGLAND 254 (1857). The year 1673 was crucial in English politics,
because royal initiatives in religion, foreign policy, and finance were all opposed by
the Tory-dominated Parliament. Charles II's initiatives ultimately failed, and he
[Vol. 48
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 48, Iss. 2 [1983], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol48/iss2/7
RULE FOR PERPETUITIES
the newly made Earl of Nottingham was in failing health. He was no
longer fully trusted by the Crown, which was demanding more complete
obedience from its partisans. In sum, Nottingham's political career re-
flected classic Tory values, with his first loyalty always to the Church, not
the King.
Some space has been devoted to discussing Nottingham's political
views, and briefly those of his colleagues, not because they were determina-
tive of the case but rather to illustrate how far removed they were from the
bourgeois or liberal views that were thought to have inspired the Rule
Against Perpetuities. If any values were reflected in Nottingham's thinking,
they were almost certainly those of the landed gentry party to which he
belonged.9 2 Accordingly, his opinion in The Duke of Norfolks Case reflects a
balanced but generally tolerant attitude towards the efforts of conveyanc-
ers. Nottingham did refer to certain types of conveyances that he would be
unwilling to countenance because they tended in the direction of a
perpetuity,93 but he saw that the old rule against contingent remainders
had been bypassed long since by the conveyancers and approved by the
judges. This had been prompted, he suggested, by "the Nature of Things,
and the Necessity of Commerce."9 4 These were the very reasons that might
have been offered for allowing the common recovery and holding Charles's
interest to have been destroyed. Nottingham, however, was perhaps more
sympathetic with the problems faced by a landowner with an heir who was
non compos mentis than he was with the abstract necessity to keep property
alienable. Naturally Nottingham relied heavily on Pells v. Brown, and he
rejected Child v. Baylie as a case "that never had any Resolution like it
before nor since." 95 In answer to the fears of the other judges, he refused to
tell them where he would draw the line, saying only that a line would be
drawn when it was needed: "They will perhaps say, where will you stop, if
not at Child and Baty~v, Case? Where? why everywhere, where there is not
any Inconvenience, any Danger of a Perpetuity. 916
The definitions found in The Duke of Norfolk's Case are instructive, for
they reflect the thinking of Pells v. Brown and Manning's Case as to what
constituted a perpetuity, and why and when it would be countenanced. An
interest in a term for years or in a freehold estate was, according to the
was forced to turn to the Earl of Danby, who controlled the House through a relia-
bly Tory policy. See D. WITCOMBE, supra note 42, at 166-72.
92. There is one notable exception to Finch's generally Tory views. His vote in
favor of Irish agricultural imports disgusted his copartisans and was clearly against
the economic interest of the gentry.
93. 3 Ch. Cas. at 28-29, 22 Eng. Rep. at 948.
94. Id. at 31, 22 Eng. Rep. at 950.
95. Id. at 35, 22 Eng. Rep. at 952.
96. Id. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953. Not surprisingly, a reading of so direct an
opinion has led at least one writer to conclude that "the Duke of Norfolk's Case was
not a restraint on executory interests but an extension." Bordwell, Alienability and
Perpetuities VI, 25 IOwA L. REv. 707, 722 (1940).
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Chancellor, not a perpetuity if the interest conveyed would not last too
long, and the test of "too long" became whatever was inconveniently long,
Lord Nottingham noted with approval the decision in Pells v. Brown where
the fee simple was cut short by an executory interest in the lifetime of a
living person; such a "Fee upon a Fee" was clearly permissible." Another
case cited in Nottingham's opinion was Cotton v. Heath,"8 which involved an
eighteen-year term to A followed by a remainder to B for life, remainder to
the first issue of B for life. The Chancellor stated that "this Contingent
upon a Contingent was allowed to be good, because it would wear out in a
short Time."9 9 Woody. Sanders,'00 decided in 1669, was also cited with ap-
proval by Nottingham because the case involved a contingency that would
take effect within two lives in being. Nottingham applauded Wood v. Sand-
ers, which was decided by Sir Orlando Bridgman himself, and the Earl re-
ferred to Bridgman with "great Reverance and Veneration for his Learning
and Integrity."' 0'
Lord Nottingham evidently wished to permit some tying up of land by
the dead hand and was willing to concede that the law should allow control
of the future ownership of land for at least one lifetime, and probably two.
What evolved from his decision, however, was not a rulefor perpetuities but
a rule of perpetuities. Admittedly, Charles's interest in the term for years
was not destructible, but neither should it be void, because his interest
would "wear itself out" in a single lifetime. Lord Nottingham's resolution
of the perpetuities problem was the kind of decision that would please Tory
landowners of the 1680's. These landowners did not want complete de-
structibility, which could ruin the family estate in a generation. They did
want freedom to transfer land, but they also wanted some means of protect-
ing the family from lunatics, wastrels, gamblers, and the like by maintain-
ing some degree of control over the future disposition of the land. Lord
Nottingham provided them with a compromise between complete aliena-
bility and the power to tie up land perpetually. Nottingham's successors
were to give even more power to the dead hand, so that in the end convey-
ancers and their clients prevailed.
What the Chancellor did was consistent with the thinking behind Man-
ning'r Case, which had held valid certain future interests in terms for years,
and, more importantly, with the logic of Pells v Brown, which had upheld
the indestructibility of executory interests. Nottingham, in effect, affirmed
Pells v. Brown, although he did not say so explicitly. He thereby laid to rest
the doubts that judges had nourished about the case for sixty years. The
dissent by Doderidge in Pells had reflected the deep-seated conviction that,
unless executory interests continued to be freely destructible, freedom of
97. 3 Ch. Cas. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953.
98. 1 Roll. Ab. 612, Pollex 26, 86 Eng. Rep. 500 (1638).
99. 3 Ch. Cas. at 35, 22 Eng. Rep. at 952.
100. 1 Ch. Cas. 131, 22 Eng. Rep. 728 (1669).
101. 3 Ch. Cas. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953.
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alienation would be curtailed and mischievous perpetuities would be en-
couraged. The underlying principle of Doderidge's dissent led many judges
to repent of the decision and even to favor its reversal. What Nottingham
did in relying on Pells v. Brown was to underscore the fact that the indestruc-
tible executory interest involved in that decision would necessarily take ef-
fect within the life of a single person, namely the brother of the first named
grantee. Nottingham viewed Charles's executory interest in The Duke of Nor-
folks Case in a similar light: Charles's interest would take effect, if at all,
within Thomas's lifetime, and hence there existed no perpetuity.
The decision in Pel/ v. Brown probably did require the eventual formu-
lation of the Rule Against Perpetuities, as has often been asserted.10 2 Ironi-
cally, Pells provided Lord Nottingham with a very strong precedent for
formulating, in its initial form, the essence of a rule that depends on a mea-
suring life. The Chancellor's definition of a perpetuity as an interest that
might exceed the duration of some measuring life was but a small step from
the modern definition of a perpetuity as an interest that will not necessarily
take effect within a life or lives in being and twenty-one years. The judges
of succeeding decades were to formulate the Rule in its modern form, but
Lord Nottingham effectively took the first step in holding Charles's interest
valid. Three respectable Tory judges had found the danger of a perpetuity
in The Duke of Norfolk's Case, but the Earl of Nottingham saw it differently.
The dead hand of the Earl of Arundel needed more room and, aided by
Heneage Finch and Sir Orlando Bridgman, it reached back into the world
of the living. A great family had to be protected from the control of a
lunatic. "It was Prudence in the Earl to take care."'
0 3
V. CONCLUSION
It would be too extravagant to state unequivocally that the Earl of
Nottingham's decision in The Duke of Norfolk's Case was influenced in whole,
or even in part, by his perception of the interests of the landed ruling class
to which he belonged. The Earl did speak of inconvenience as a test for
perpetuities, and he praised the prudence of Sir Orlando Bridgman, one of
the greatest ornaments of his profession. These are sentiments that one
might expect from a landed gentleman familiar with the need to protect
estates, but they can not be said to prove Nottingham's motive for deciding
as he did. More probably, the Chancellor saw himself as a rationalizer of
the confused law of estates and future interests, producing a result that ful-
filled a need of the law rather than the interest of any given class. More-
over, the interests of the law and of the landed class were not entirely clear.
The common law judges, North, Pemberton, and Montagu, were landed
gentry of prominent families. Yet they saw in the Earl of Arundel's trust
the spectre of perpetuity, which they opposed as inimical to both their class
102. J. GRAY, supra note 13, § 121.7.
103. 3 Ch. Cas. at 36, 22 Eng. Rep. at 953.
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and the law. It is perhaps enough to say that time proved Nottingham
right. No truly permanent perpetuity haunted the land, and the gentry
prospered in the eighteenth century.
If the motivation of the Rule's creator, or that of its opponents, may
never be entirely clear, it can at least be suggested that the reasons for the
Rule are not as simple as has been believed. The test of a "life in being,"
and later a "life in being and twenty-one years," was ultimately a compro-
mise, as any limit on the power of a draftsman must be. Compromises gen-
erally emerge when an existing structure yields to a rising force. The
existing legal structure of the seventeenth century was not one of unchecked
perpetuities but a rigid, already weakened system in which future interests
could be found destructible or void and present owners were often compar-
atively free to break their parents' wills. The rising force of seventeenth
century England was not a new capitalist ethic that demanded an end to
perpetuities but a spirit of tolerance for the needs of an increasingly domi-
nant landed class that desperately needed more room to maneuver in order
to secure its own future. The Rule meant that what had once been consid-
ered a perpetuity was one no longer. In this sense the new Rule was a clear
victory for the dead hand, not for free alienability. The rule served the
fathers, not the sons, and if it did not attempt to make lawful a whole pano-
ply of perpetuities, it did at least allow most that were needed.
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